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COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
SECOND CIRCUIT
Burnette v. Carothers, Nos. 98-7835(L), 98-9003(CON), 1999 WL
710624 (2d Cir. Sept. 13, 1999) (holding homeowners' suit for
injunctive and monetary relief under the CWA, RCRA, and CERCLA
citizen suit provisions brought against state officers in their official
capacity was barred for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity).
The Burnettes filed suit against various state officers in their
official capacities claiming the Connecticut Correctional Institute
("CCI") had emanated toxic substances onto their property that
polluted and continued to pollute their wells in violation of the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"); and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). The Burnettes sought
an injunction, monetary relief, and reimbursement for past and future
response costs.
At the trial court, the state officers successfully argued that the case
was barred for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the sovereign
immunity clause of the Eleventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
The court granted the state officers' motion for
summary judgment on the claims for response costs because recovery
would violate the state's sovereign immunity. The Burnettes appealed.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed based on
congressional intent explicitly stated in each of the statutes under
which the Burnettes sued, acknowledging that citizen suits against
governmental entities were allowed only to the extent pennitted by the
Eleventh Amendment.
The court rejected the Burnettes' argument that the case
represented qui tam action, brought by the Burnettes on behalf of the
United States, and held that citizen suit provisions granted citizens the
right to sue on their own behalf, not on behalf of the United States.
Next, the Burnettes argued that the claims for prospective relief
were valid under Ex Parte Young. The court waived this claim because

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

the Burnettes had not raised the claim in the original case, and no
miscarriage ofjustice resulted by not recognizing the exception.
Through summary judgment, the court denied both claims that
sought response costs. The court denied the CERCLA § 113(f) claim,
because the provision was only available to parties potentially
responsible for contribution costs which the Burnettes were not. The
court also denied the CERCLA § 107(a) claim, because although
Congress did express its intention that the Eleventh Amendment
would not bar a suit under the section, Congress did not have valid
power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. The United States
Supreme Court ruled Congress acted within its authority when it
abrogated the Eleventh Amendment only once; the Court ruled
Congress could abrogate the Eleventh Amendment only when
enacting legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
CERCLA, enacted under the Commerce Clause, did not fall into this
category.
The court also ruled Connecticut did not constructively waive its
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity by engaging in an activity
regulated by Congress or by accepting federal funds.
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United States v. TGR Corp., 171 F.3d 762 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that
brook where defendant discharged waste slurry from asbestos removal
project qualified as "waters of the United States" under the Clean
Water Act).
Employees of the defendant, TGR Corp. ("TGR"), performed
asbestos removal services for a Connecticut middle school. In the
process, the employees poured a waste slurry (comprised of mastic,
chemical mastic remover, water, and pieces of floor tile that contained
asbestos) into a drain in the school basement. From the drain, the
slurry traveled into a storm water discharge system, and then into a
waterway known as "Grasmere Brook."
The government charged TGR with knowingly discharging a
pollutant into the waters of the United States without a permit in
violation of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1319(c)(2), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and
knowingly disposing and storing of a hazardous waste without a permit
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2) (A) and 18 U.S.C. §2. The court
dismissed the latter two violations. The parties entered into a
stipulation agreement and the only issue remaining concerned
whether Grasmere Brook qualified as part of the "waters of United
States" under the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
The district court held that Grasmere Brook was a tributary of Ash
Creek, a navigable water of the United States, and therefore fell under
the CWA. The court ordered TGR to pay a fine of $50,000 and remain
on probation for five years. TGR appealed.

